HHJ Wood QC, Chester CC, 22nd January 2016. Individual heads of loss agreed in the Portal are binding whilst the case remains in the Portal, overturning Bushell v Parry and upholding Bewicke-Copley v Ibeh Key Points Agreements on individual heads of loss are binding at Stage 2 and (Obiter) Portal settlements on complete claims are binding to the World Maddocks v Lyne HHJ Wood QC, Chester CC, 22nd January 2016 Parties agreed some individual heads of loss during Stage 2, but at the Stage 3 hearing the Claimant re-opened them, which the judge allowed. The Defendant appealed, arguing that agreements reached in the Portal on individual heads of were binding. The Defendant argued how the a Stage 3 hearing was defined as a hearing to determine items which remained in dispute. The Claimant argued that the wording of the rules only referred to 'offer' in the singular. The Defendant relied on Bewicke-Copley v Ibeh which said they are, and the Claimant relied on Bushell v Parry which said they were not. Permission to appeal, in some delicious irony, was given to the Defendants by HHJ Gregory, who had decided the Bushell case. In a long and reserved judgment, HHJ Wood QC held that where a claim remained in the Portal, as here, those items agreed at Stage 2 would be binding on both parties except in very exceptional cases. The judge went on to find, obiter, that if the matter left the Portal, then individual heads of loss were not binding, although the judgment notes that no argument was heard on this point. The court also went on to find, again obiter, that if all heads of loss were agreed in the Portal then it was binding on the world. Whilst confirming the original position as found in Bewicke-Copley v Ibeh , this decision also resolved the dispute between the inconsistent decisions of Ullah v Jon and Malak v Nasim , on whether admissions in the Portal are binding outside of that Portal claim where there is no judgment, by confirming that where settlement is reached on all heads of loss that the agreement is binding on the world, it does not require a judgment to be binding. That point was then confirmed, ratio, 10 months later in the appeal decision of Chimel v Chibwana & Williams . Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Tennant v Cottrell DJ Jenkinson, Liverpool CC, 11th December 2014 - you cannot change your reason for breach of Portal after the event, and there can be no 'Retrospective Justification' of an earlier Portal breach by what happened later. Key Points Cannot change reason for breach of Portal and there can be no 'Retrospective Justification' of an earlier Portal breach Tennant v Cottrell DJ Jenkinson, Liverpool CC, 11th December 2014 The Claimant removed this claim from the Portal when the Defendant made an offer of zero for one head of loss. Part 7 proceedings were issued in which the Defendant sought allocation to the fast track, and for the Claimant to attend for cross-examination. Costs went to Detailed Assessment. In Replies to Points of Dispute, the Claimant tried to argue for the first time that the claim had left the Portal because it was too complex, and pointed to the fact that the Defendant had sought to cross-examine the Claimant and allocate the claim. However, DJ Jenkinson found that the reason the Claimant had left the Portal was completely clear. That was set out in their letter at the time they left the Portal, stating they were doing so because the Defendant had offered zero on one head of loss. The judge said that you could not change your reason for leaving the Portal later, and there could be no argument that a claim 'would have left anyway'. o allow such an argument would be to allow a Claimant to 'retrospectively justify' their earlier unreasonable exit. He would not allow this. The Claimant was restricted to Portal costs. Claimants often try to argue that a claim 'would have left the Portal anyway'. However as this case makes clear, a party cannot change their reasons for leaving later, nor can they rely on anything which happened after a breach of the Portal when assessing whether they had acted unreasonably under CPR 45.24(2). Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Purcell v McGarry - HHJ Gore QC, Liverpool CC, Friday 7th December 2012. The court held that the portal offers were still open for acceptance after Stage 2 had ended, despite the portal protocol implying otherwise. Contract Law, including offer and acceptance, has no place in MOJ Portal Protocol cases. Key Points Contract Law, including offer and acceptance, has no place in MOJ Portal Protocol cases Purcell v McGarry HHJ Gore QC, Liverpool CC, Friday 7th Dec 2012 The issue here on first tier appeal was whether a Defendant could accept an offer after the end of Stage 2. The judge held that a Portal offer remains open for acceptance after the end of Stage 2. Importantly he noted that contract rules such as offer and acceptance have no place in the Portal arena. This case is important as it establishes that a Portal offer does not automatically cease to be open for acceptance. It has been followed by other cases which have held how offers made in the Portal remain open for acceptance even after Part 7 proceedings have been issued. It also makes it clear that the Portal is 'its own man' and thus contract law does not apply. Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Payne v Scott DDJ Smedley, Birkenhead CC, 13th July 2015 Key Point A Claimant can still have caused a claim to leave the Portal under CPR 45.24(2) when they ask a judge to order it out and that judge does so Payne v Scott DDJ Smedley, Birkenhead CC, 13th July 2015 The Claimant claimed loss of earnings in the Portal but did not properly evidence that head of loss during Stage 2. At the start of the Stage 3 hearing, the Claimant asked the court to remove the claim from the Portal and place it into Part 7 proceedings, saying it was unsuitable and further evidence was required. The Defendant weakly objected. The judge duly ordered the claim out of the Portal and into Part 7 proceedings. The Defendant argued that the Claimant should be restricted to Portal costs under CPR 45.24(2)(b). However, the Claimant argued that they did not remove the claim from the Portal, the court ordered it out. The Defendant relied on Ilahi v Usman and Doyle v Manchester Audi , arguing that where a party chooses to take a step or omit to take a step, which causes a claim to leave the Portal, then they have chosen to remove the claim from the Portal. The judge was hesitant to find that the Claimant had acted unreasonably in circumstances where the Defendant had not really objected to the claim leaving the Portal. However, on balance he found that the Claimant had acted unreasonably, they had caused the claim to leave the Portal, and he did restrict the Claimant to Portal costs. Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Costs awarded under CPR 45.29J for exceptional circumstances in SIIIA CPR 45 fixed costs. Key Point SIIIA Exceptional Circumstances Costs awarded under CPR 45.29J Lloyd v 2 Sisters Poultry Ltd HHJ Howells, Mold County Court, 29th Jan 2019 This was an appeal in a SIIIA case where the lower court had found exceptional circumstances and awarded costs under CPR 45.29J. On appeal the court considered the swings and roundabouts nature of fixed costs, but found the lower court had correctly weighed all the relevant issues in the balance, and that decision could not be faulted. The claim arose from a personal injury accident at the Claimant's place of employment. Liability was not disputed. Initially the claim began relying on one medical report, but a subsequent report gave a much gloomier picture and indicated the Claimant had a permanent injury and would be disabled within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010. The appeal court noted at [13] that the lower court's attention had been drawn to the extensive work carried out, with the solicitor correspondence running to some 63 pages with little padding, the schedule of special damages alone amounting to over £71,500 which was 27 pages long, a detailed Ogden 7 calculations for future loss of earnings, an alternative Billet approach with a witness statement from the Claimant running to 16 pages dealing in detail with the Claimant's pre-existing medical conditions, current conditions, education, employment, need for care and assistance - all of which was relevant to the future loss of earnings and Ogden/Billet calculations. At [17-18] the court considered Hislop v Perde , and noted how LJ Coulson had 'uncoupled' the link between the causation of increased costs and the award of exceptional circumstances costs there. HHJ Howells noted that the lower court had taken all the relevant factors into account, particularly the permanent disability and the Ogden calculations, but also the value of the claim, and concluded they were appropriate factors for the court to consider made this case exceptional for the test in CPR 45.29J. The appeal was dismissed and the Claimant kept their award of open costs. This case is unusual in that it is one of only two cases (the other being Jackson v Barfoot Farms ) I am aware of where non-fixed costs have been awarded under CPR 45.29J. In both cases, the Claimant suffered significant and permanent injuries. Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Hussain v Wardle - DJ Rank, Stoke on Trent CC, 25th February 2017. Here the CNF was rejected for lack of information. There was no test of reasonableness in CPR 45.24(2)(a) - unlike with leaving the Portal under CPR 45.24(2)(b)(i-iii). Key Point CNF rejected for lack of information - no test of reasonableness in CPR 45.24(2)(a) - unlike with leaving the Portal under CPR 45.24(2)(b)(i-iii) Hussain v Wardle Stoke on Trent CC, DJ Rank, 25th February 2017 The Claimant brought a claim in the MOJ Portal but failed to provide the Defendant's name in the CNF. The Defendant's name had not been provided at the scene. The Defendant Insurer rejected the CNF for incomplete information on it. The Defendant's name is a mandatory field. The Claimant then issued Part 7 proceedings and the claim settled by way of Part 36 offer. Costs went to Detailed Assessment. On Provisional Assessment the court found that the Claimant was in breach of the Portal Protocol, and restricted the Claimant to Portal costs. However, the Claimant applied for Oral Review, arguing it was not their fault they had failed to provide this mandatory information, and they had made good efforts to settle the claim after the claim left the Portal and before proceedings were issued, which should count in their favour. The court found there was a breach of the Portal Protocol, and went on to consider whether to exercise their discretion under CPR 45.24(2)(b). The court agreed with the Defendant that they could not use hindsight and speculation, per Tennant v Cottrell and Dawrant v Part & Parcel Network . Thus what happened after the Portal breach was irrelevant. The court agreed with the non-binding finding in Raja v Day & MIB , that the default position on the finding of a breach was that Portal costs should apply. The court found there were no exceptional circumstances which would justify a change from the default position. There were well-established ways of finding out the Defendant's details. The court also considered the fact that the claim had settled by way of a Part 36 offer, but rejected the Claimant's argument that this precluded an award under CPR 45.24(2). DJ Rank relied on the judgment of Lo rd Justice Moore-Bick in Solomon v Cromwell in this regard and quoted him at [17] thus: If the appellants' argument were correct, the acceptance of a Part 36 offer would always result in an order for costs on the standard basis in low-value road traffic accident cases. That would undermine the fixed costs regime and provide a powerful incentive for defendants not to make Part 36 offers in such cases... In the absence of any exceptional circumstances which would justify departing from the established default position, the court found that they would restrict the Claimant to Portal costs. There are not many cases of claims which have come out of the Portal because of lack of information on the CNF, so this is a particularly useful case. Note that there is no test of reasonableness in CPR 45.24(2)(a) as there is in CPR 45.24(2)(b). Thus even though the Claimant had ostensibly a good reason for not completing one of the mandatory fields, it could not and did not avail him. The rule in CPR 45.24(2)(a) only requires the Defendant to have rejected the claim because of INSUFFICIENT information. There is no requirement for the missing information to be mandatory. There is a curious further Portal provision at para 6.8 of the RTA Protocol, which provides that where a Defendant considers inadequate MANDATORY information has been provided, that shall be a valid reason for the Defendant to decide that the claim should no longer continue under the Protocol. There is no assessment of the reasonableness or not of the Defendant anywhere in CPR 45.24, there is no weighing of each party's behaviour, so it is unclear why this rule exists. In practice, it seems to operate to strengthen a Defendant's position when seeking an order under CPR 45.24(2)(a) where the insufficient information arises from a missing or incomplete mandatory field. However it does appear to some litigants into thinking that there is a benefit in trying to establish that a Defendant's decision to reject a CNF was invalid. Time will tell. Watch this space! Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Harris v Brown HHJ Davey QC, Bradford CC, 18th June 2019 - An interesting judicial difference of opinion was formed in this case on whether the Portal is an entirely stand-alone code, or whether common law doctrines can apply. Here the judge found that common law mistake did apply. Key Point Common law Mistake does apply in the MOJ Portal Protocol where offeree knows of mistake when accepts Harris v Brown HHJ Davey QC, Bradford CC, 18th June 2019 An interesting judicial difference of opinion was formed in this case on whether the Portal is an entirely stand-alone code, or whether common law doctrines can apply. Here the judge found that common law mistake did apply. Unfortunately the judge was mis-informed by both counsel that in Draper v Newport and Fitton v Ageas, the party accepting the offer did not know that a mistake had been made. The judge thus distinguished those two cases and decided that common law mistake did apply. It is interesting to speculate over whether the decision would have been any different had the judge been given the correct details. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was refused. Click here for a copy of the refusal decision. Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Go back to Topic Index Main Index Topic Index

Soft Tissue Injury Claims in the MOJ Portal. Case law on para 7.8B of the MOJ RTA Portal Protocol concerning disclosure of multiple reports where the case is a soft tissue injury claim. Soft Tissue Injuries Claims Mason v Laing HHJ Gosnell, Bradford CC, 20.01.20 The Portal rules are strict; if in a soft tissue injury claim the first report is not disclosed before subsequent ones, a Claimant cannot rely on the subsequent reports. Greyson v Fuller [2022] EWHC 211 (QB) The High Court held that where the reports were served together, the sanction was costs, not the admissibility of the report. Moesaid v Calder DDJ Kube, Manchester CC, 27th August 2021 Where a subsequent report took the claim out of the definition of soft tissue injury claim, it did not matter when the reports were disclosed, the special rules on soft tissue injuries did not apply. Abdulmalik v Calder DJ Carter, Manchester CC, 2nd Feb 2022 There was no requirement for the first report to be disclosed before the second report was obtained, only disclosed. However, compliance with the order of disclosure required did not mean that the cost of the report would automatically be allowed - the court could still disallow it for other reasons. The time to consider whether the claim was a soft tissue injury claim was when the second report was being disclosed. Go Back to Index Click on the button below to go back to the case law index Index Search the site here:

Other cases by Sarah Robson Barrister - including McNiven v Walsh on premature issue, Harwood v Kapek on miscellaneous expenses, Alrahi v Ellis on breach of the PI pre-action protocol, Ghattaorya v Bailey on miscellaneous expenses, Pathak v Collins on premature issue, R on hte Application of Newham LBC v Stratford Magistrates' Court [2008] EWHC 125 (Admin) [2008] All ER (D) 17 (Jan) [2008] RA 108, 173 JP 2008, Jamil v Harling on pleading unsupported head of loss, Smith v Irving on prem issue Other Reported Cases In addition to many cases reported on the All England Law Reports, Bailii, Current Law, Kemp & Kemp and Lawtel, Sarah has the following reported cases: Please see 'Index Portal & Fixed costs Cases' for details of Fixed Costs cases McNiven v Walsh (2011) LTLPI 26/1/2012 Sarah successfully argued premature issue and breach of the personal injury pre-action protocol/practice direction on pre-action conduct in this non- MOJ Portal disposal case. The claimant served a medical report pre-issue detailing one set of injuries/loss of amenity, but shortly before trial served a witness statement extending some of the symptoms, an extending the loss of amenity, thereby putting the defendant's part 36 offer at risk. In a reserved judgment, the judge held this was a clear breach of the personal injury pre-action protocol as well as not in compliance with the Practice Direction on pre-action conduct. He found that this was premature issue because the claimant's solicitors had not taken adequate instructions pre-issue, and they had not provided the defendant with sufficient information to enable the defendant to make a protective offer. The claimant was restricted to predictive costs and was ordered to pay all the defendant's costs. Harwood v Kapek (2010) LTLPI 21/7/2010 Sarah was defending in this personal injury disposal case in front of HHJ Harrington. C sought to recover £50 miscellaneous expenses. However, the court accepted Sarah's submissions that the claim for miscellaneous expenses should be disallowed in its entirety, confirming the lower judge's decision on this point in Ghattaorya v Bailey (below). The judge added that it was 'only common sense that sums should be particularised and that as the round figures referred to in the witness statements were fairly general, such an award should not be made.' This is an important decision for defendants - particularly when defending close part 36 offers, as reducing special damages can be the key to success. Instructed by Judith Hartley (now Judith Hall) of Ashton Morton Slack (now Horwich Farrelly LLP Sheffield.) Alrahi v Ellis (2009) LTLPI 04/06/2010 Sarah was defending in this personal injury disposal case. Whilst the defendant had beaten their pre-issue part 36 offer, she also argued the claimant should not get all their predictive costs because of their failure to follow the pre-action protocol. (Pre-issue, the claimant had only made 2 highly unrealistic offers which was not ‘negotiation’ as required by the protocol, further C had failed to supply evidence in support of some of the specials. Jamil v Harling (2007) LTLPI 18/3/2008 considered.) The judge agreed and reduced the claimant's costs to 2/3rds of the profit costs allowable under the predictive fees regime, plus the medical disbursements. The defendant was also awarded interest on their costs at 8%. This decision shows that where there is a breach of the pre-action protocol, the judge has a wide range of cost sanctions available even where a defendant has beaten their offer and the starting position in practice is for C to get predictive costs. Instructed by Graham Isaacs of Berrymans Lace Mawer LLP Manchester (now of Hill Dickinson LLP.) Ghattaorya v Bailey (2009) LTLPI 05/10/2009 Sarah was again defending in this personal injury disposal case. The claimant claimed for a 24 - 38 month neck and lumbar spine whiplash injury, with a 2 years travel anxiety. However, the court found the evidence of the claimant to be extremely unsatisfactory. The court awarded for a 6-months neck injury, disallowing the claim for the lumbar spine and all specials relating to the lumbar spine. The court also disallowed the claim for miscellaneous expenses in its entirety, noting that the cost of telephone calls was relatively low nowadays. The judge commented that claiming for miscellaneous expenses was a bad habit claimant solicitors had got into. Instructed by Patrick McCarthy of Horwich Farrelly Solicitors, Manchester. Pathak v Collins Stafford County Court LTLPI 27/3/2009 In a personal injury disposal case, Sarah successfully argued that the winning claimant should not be entitled to any costs. The claimant suffered a 4 month cervical spine whiplash injury. Prior to the issue of proceedings, the claimant had made a global Pt 36 offer in the sum of £2,362.35 and the defendant had made a global Pt 36 offer in the sum of £1,900. The defendant beat her offer. Sarah successfully argued that the claimant’s single pre-issue offer was highly unrealistic (approx £2,000 for generals for a bare 4-month whiplash) and therefore the claimant had failed to comply with the pre-action protocol by not entering into any genuine negotiations. She further contended that to further the over-riding objective, the court had to disallow all the claimant’s costs because to allow even predictive costs would give the claimant what they would have received had the protocol been complied with. The judge held that the claimant’s offer was wholly unrealistic and they had not complied with the rules and pre-action protocol wholeheartedly. The claimant could not recover her costs for up to 21 days after D’s offer, which would normally apply, nor even predictive costs, but only the medical report disbursement. This was because of the claimant’s unrealistic stance pre-issue on a bare four-month whiplash and her failure to comply with the protocol. Also, her costs schedule was, on any view, inflated. Yvonne Hazel Painting v University of Oxford (2005) [2005] EWCA Civ 161, Haywood v Haywood (2006) LTLPI 2/6/2006, Smith v Chantelle Irving (2006) LTLPI 26/2/2007, Mark Chatburn v Spicer (2007) LTLPI 19/6/2007 and Jamil v Harling (2007) LTLPI 18/3/2008 considered. Instructed by Graham Isaacs, Berrymans Lace Mawer Solicitors, Manchester (now of Hill Dickinson LLP.) R (on the application of Newham London Borough Council) v Stratford Magistrates' Court [2008] EWHC 125 (Admin), [2008] All ER (D) 17 (Jan) [2008] RA 108, 173 JP 30 2008 On judicial review Sarah successfully argued in the RCJ that the Magistrates’ Court had erred in setting aside liability orders which had been made 2½ - 5½ years earlier. The lower court should have had regard to the principle of finality of litigation; if a defendant's case was a liability order should be set aside and the delay in applying was because he had only very recently learnt of its existence, the court had to investigate how long that notice was. It was insufficient to say it would be in the interests of justice to set aside a liability order. Postscript: The matter was re-listed by the Magistrates. The Magistrates Court found that Mr Dublin had failed to make his application sufficiently promptly from when he had knowledge of the liability orders. Instructed by Robert Taylor, Barclay Taylor Solicitors, London. Jamil v Harling (2007) LTLPI 18/3/2008 Sarah successfully resisted an application by the claimant to accept the defendant’s payment in out of time, whilst still retaining Pt 36 costs protection. Also the claimant advanced a head of claim for which there was no evidence. The judge held the solicitors for the claimant should have come off the record once it became apparent they could not support this head of claim. Sarah successfully argued the claimant should not recover any costs because of their poor conduct. The court ordered the claimant was not entitled to any costs or disbursements, not even up to 21 days before the defendant’s payment in, and the claimant had to pay all the defendant’s costs. Instructed by Philip Dearden, Ashton Morton Slack, Sheffield (Now part of Horwich Farrelly.) Smith v Chantelle Irving (2006) LTLPI 26/2/2007 Sarah successfully argued no costs should be awarded to the successful claimant in a disposal hearing because of the conduct of the claimant’s solicitors. The court held the claimant’s solicitors had grossly over-valued the claim and failed to enter into real negotiations having only made one unrealistic offer before issue. Further, the claimant’s costs were exaggerated and difficult to justify. The court ordered a partner from the claimant’s solicitors to file and serve a witness statement explaining their conduct to the judge. Instructed by Philip Dearden, Ashton Morton Slack, Sheffield (Now part of Horwich Farrelly.) Search the site here:

Birkenhead CC, DJ Campbell, 30th November 2016. Yes friend, they seriously litigated over £2.50p. Key Point Unreasonable to leave portal for technical non-compliance only Smith v Owen Birkenhead CC, DJ Campbell, 30th Nov 2016 Here the claimant removed the claim from the MOJ RTA Portal for of two disbursements, one for photographs and one for the DVLA disbursements. The issue was whether the Claimant had acted unreasonably in doing so. The disbursement for photographs was not agreed. The Defendant said as much and it was virtually common ground that in disputing the disbursement, saying why it was in dispute, then the Defendant was not in breach by failing to pay that. The main argument was on the non-payment of the DVLA disbursement, a mere £2.50. The Claimant relied on the case of Chisanga which had held it was reasonable to leave the Portal for non-payment of the DVLA disbursement. However, DJ Campbell disagreed, noting she had been a solicitor for 20 years and would have been appalled at the idea of anyone in her firm issuing proceedings simply because of a non payment of £2.50 which it was well known would easily be 'scooped up' to be paid when the final order was made. The court decided at [47] that whilst there was no obligation under the rules for a Claimant to check with a Defendant why the £2.50 had not been paid, it was incumbent on any solicitor acting reasonably to have queried where the £2.50 was. She confirmed the approach of DJ Peake in Kilby v Brown to act reasonably and enquire before issuing. Whilst she acknowledged this made her decision at odds with another judge at the same court, she reached this decision based on her interpretation of the rules and meant no criticism on the other judge. The Claimant had acted unreasonably in leaving the Portal, and would be restricted to Portal costs. Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Brown v Ezeugwa HHJ Simpkiss (Designated Circuit Judge) with DJ Lethem (Regional Costs Judge) as assessor Tunbridge Wells CC, 23rd January 2014 - A court can order Portal costs under CPR 45.24 even where a Part 36 offer has been accepted. Key Point A court can order Portal costs under CPR 45.24 even where a Part 36 offer has been accepted Brown v Ezeugwa HHJ Simpkiss (Designated Circuit Judge) with DJ Lethem (Regional Costs Judge) as assessor Tunbridge Wells CC, 23rd January 2014 The claim left the Portal and went into Part 7 proceedings where it was settled by a consent order. That read that the Defendant was to pay the Claimant standard basis costs to be assessed if not agreed. The Claimant argued that meant they could not be restricted to fixed Portal and had the Defendant wanted to argue that fixed costs applied they should have done so before the order was made, not when costs were being assessed. The court noted there were two issued, firstly whether the paying party could take a point under CPR 45.36 (now 45.24) at the time the judgment was given and secondly whether an award of costs on the standard basis precluded an argument under CPR 45.36 (now CPR 45.24). The court held there was nothing in the rules which supported the contention that an order for costs under CPR 45.36 (now 45.24) had to be made at the time the order for costs was made. The court also noted that if the Rules Committee had intended that power should only be exercised at the stage when a costs order was made then it was surprising that the provision was not included in Part 44. At [28] the court held: 28. ...The issues in relation to costs fall into three stages. Stage 1 is the award of costs. Stage 2 is the decision by the assessing judge of what the order for costs means, and stage 3 is the quantification on that basis. 29. In this case Stage 1 was consented to in the order of 12th December 2012. The Defendant was to pay the Claimant’s costs, and the basis of costs was to be the standard basis. Stage 2 was, not surprisingly and not unusually, elided into Stage 3, but the deputy district judge did set about the assessment on the basis of a standard basis assessment. 30. Where, in our judgment, he went wrong was not to apply his mind to the distinction between the award of costs and the direction as to the basis that the assessment should take place with the quantification or assessment process itself. CPR 44.3 and 4 are concerned with the award and the basis of assessment. CPR 45, albeit relating to fixed costs, is one of the provisions that deals with the quantification of those costs, and therefore in our judgment there is no reason why the assessing judge cannot exercise the powers under 45.36 in carrying out that assessment. Thus the court confirmed that an order for standard basis costs does not preclude costs being assessed under CPR 45.24 (was 45.36). The court also confirmed the position found in Patel v Fortis that a court has the power to restrict a Claimant to Portal costs following settlement, not just judgment, a position reversed in Williams v Secretary of State for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy [2018] EWCA Civ 852 . Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Case law on using the MOJ Portal Protocols - with the key point, a short summary and a copy of the judgment. Including LB Islington v Bourous [2022] EWCA Civ 1242, Wicks v Blair [2022] EWCA Civ 1242, Akram v Aviva HHJ Jarman QC, Wrexham CC, 29.09.21, Mulholland v Hughes HHJ Freedman, Newcastle CC, 18.09.15, Raja v Day HHJ Gregory, Liverpool CC, 02.03.15 and many other cases. Using the Portals MH Site Maintenance Services Ltd & Markerstudy Insurance Services Ltd v James Watson [2025] EWCA Civ 775 A court has the power to make orders in a Portal claim once Stage 3 Part 8 proceedings have been issued. London Borough of Islington v Bourous, Davis & Yousaf [2022] EWCA Civ 1242 Approved Mulholland v Hughes that a party cannot argue something in Stage 3 not raised in Stage 2, and commented that the White Book note re Phillips v Willis is not accurate. Wickes Building Supplies Ltd v Blair (No.2) Costs [2020] EWCA Civ 17 The Court of Appeal agreed with Sarah Robson that QOCS applied to this second tier appeal, preferring the reasoning of Edis J in Parker v Butler [2016] EWHC 1251 (QB) over that in both Wagenaar v Weekend Travel Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1105 and Hawksford Trustees Jersey Ltd v Stella Global UK Ltd and another [2012] EWCA Civ 987. Not to apply QOCS on appeals would deny access to justice. Wickes Building Supplies Ltd v Blair [2019] EWCA Civ 1934 The Court of Appeal considered whether objecting to the claimant's late witness statement, served just a couple of days after the end of Stage 2, was objecting to the claim under para 9.1 of PD 8B. At first instance the court had simply rejected the late statement. At first tier appeal the court found that the defendant was opposing the claim because the evidence was not provided under the relevant protocol. However, the Court of Appeal held the judge at first instance was correct, and quashed the first tier appeal decision. (1) Akram v Aviva Insurance Ltd and (2) Mahmood v Tillott HHJ Jarman QC, Wrexham CC, 29th Sept 2021 (The Claimants in both appeals relied on emails from their solicitors uploaded in Stage 2 at the Stage 3 hearings. The Defendant appealed both arguing no weight should be given to the contents of those emails, and that the information therein could only be provided by way of witness statement. HHJ Jarman QC upheld both lower court decisions finding that this was appropriate in the fairly rough justice of the Portal.) Mulholland v Hughes HHJ Freedman, Newcastle CC, 18th Sept 2015 (First Tier Appeal - Offers in the Portal do not amount to admissions, Claimants have to repay over-payment of damages in non-settlement payment, Arguments at Stage 3 limited by those in Stage 2 pack.) Khan v Alliance Insurance Plc HHJ Gosnell, Leeds CC, 1st Jun 2020 (Judge cannot raise an issue in Stage 3 not raised by the parties in Stage 2; Defendant can only challenge claim in limited way in the Portal.) Mozzano v Riwa DDJ Dawson, Birkenhead CC, 24th April 2012 (Multiple CNFs - how to deal.) Raja v Day & MIB HHJ Gregory, Liverpool CC, 02.03.15 (First Tier Appeal - Default position on finding a Portal breach is fixed costs, burden shifts to Claimant to show why should not apply.) Smith v Owen Birkenhead CC, DJ Campbell, 30th November 2016 (Unreasonable exit for non payment of tiny disbursement.) Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Yavuz & Ors [2017] EWHC 3088 (QB) (6 Dec 2017) (Contempt re completion of CNF.) David Grant v Dawn Meats (UK) [2018] EWCA Civ 2212 (Limitation, Stays and Service of a Portal Claim form.) Go Back to Index Click on the button below to go back to the case law index Index Search the site here: