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Key Point Key Point Interpreter's fees are recoverable under SIIIA Santiago v MIB [2023] EWCA Civ 838 Here the Court of Appeal grappled with the problem that interpreter's fees were, prima facie, not recoverable as a disbursement in a case to which SIIIA fixed costs applied. Following Cham v Aldred, it was generally accepted that a disbursement could only be recoverable if it arose because of a particular feature of the dispute. In Cham, the disbursement there arose because of a particular feature of the Claimant, namely that they were a child, and thus needed an opinion on quantum before any settlement could be approved. CPR 45.19(2)(e) stipulated that any disbursement not specified could only be recoverable it is arose because of a particular feature of the dispute. As the disbursement arose because of a particular feature of the Claimant, it was not recoverable. The same would therefore apply to interpreter's fees. However, since Cham had been decided, the Civil Justice Council published a report called 'Vulnerable Witnesses and Parties within the Civil Proceedings/ Current position and Recommendations for Change.' This report was addressing the critical need to ensure fair access to justice, and noted the need for interpreters, and that being unable to understand the proceedings made a person vulnerable, in that they could not participate nor give their best evidence. The court had regard to CPR 1.2(b) which required the court to give effect to the overriding objective when interpreting any rule, to ensure parties are on an equal footing and that the case is dealt with fairly. At [62] the court held: the use of the word “other” in sub-paragraph (h) supports the broader interpretation because it implies that the travel expenses and loss of earnings incurred by a party and allowed under sub-paragraphs (f) and (g) are disbursements that are “due to a particular feature of the dispute.” The common feature of such costs is that they facilitate the attendance of a party or witness and thus put the parties on an equal footing by enabling the party or witness to participate fully in the hearing. That is also a defining feature of the cost of an interpreter, without whom the party or witness cannot participate fully in the hearing and, specifically, cannot give their best evidence. Allowing the interpreter’s fee to be recovered under subparagraph (h) is therefore consistent with the inclusion of the disbursements allowed under sub-paragraphs (f) and (g). I would therefore hold that the application of normal principles of construction does not preclude the interpretation of sub-paragraph (h) for which Mr Williams contends. Far from it: in my judgment, the application of normal principles strongly supports his proposed interpretation. I would have reached this conclusion before the 2021 Amendments. At [59] the court noted that in Cham, the disbursement was only incurred after parties had settled, so had no impact on reaching the settlement concerned, whereas without an interpreter, a Claimant who did not speak English could not even get their claim off the ground. The court also noted that the cost of counsel's advice was deemded to be included in the costs allowed in Table 6B, whereas if an interpreter's fee was not recoverable as a disbursement, it was not remunerated at all, either actually or notionally. Therefore the Court of Appeal held that the cost of translator fees were recoverable. At [64] they concluded: "This distinction permits us to conclude that we are not bound by Cham to adopt an interpretation of sub-paragraph (h) which is not in accordance with the overriding objective on the different facts that are in play in the present appeal. I would accept that the effect of Cham is that a disbursement should ordinarily be held to be “reasonably incurred due to a particular feature of the dispute” within sub-paragraph (h) if it was required to enable the determination by the Court of a particular issue in the case rather than because of a particular characteristic of a party or witness. However, where considerations of access to justice arise, a broader interpretation is necessary to enable the dispute to be determined by the Court in accordance with the overriding objective. It follows, in my judgment, that the independent interpreter’s fee (assuming it to be reasonably incurred) is properly to be regarded as a disbursement falling within sub-paragraph (h)." Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Case law on using the MOJ Portal Protocols - with the key point, a short summary and a copy of the judgment. Including LB Islington v Bourous [2022] EWCA Civ 1242, Wicks v Blair [2022] EWCA Civ 1242, Akram v Aviva HHJ Jarman QC, Wrexham CC, 29.09.21, Mulholland v Hughes HHJ Freedman, Newcastle CC, 18.09.15, Raja v Day HHJ Gregory, Liverpool CC, 02.03.15 and many other cases. Using the Portals MH Site Maintenance Services Ltd & Markerstudy Insurance Services Ltd v James Watson [2025] EWCA Civ 775 A court has the power to make orders in a Portal claim once Stage 3 Part 8 proceedings have been issued. London Borough of Islington v Bourous, Davis & Yousaf [2022] EWCA Civ 1242 Approved Mulholland v Hughes that a party cannot argue something in Stage 3 not raised in Stage 2, and commented that the White Book note re Phillips v Willis is not accurate. Wickes Building Supplies Ltd v Blair (No.2) Costs [2020] EWCA Civ 17 The Court of Appeal agreed with Sarah Robson that QOCS applied to this second tier appeal, preferring the reasoning of Edis J in Parker v Butler [2016] EWHC 1251 (QB) over that in both Wagenaar v Weekend Travel Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1105 and Hawksford Trustees Jersey Ltd v Stella Global UK Ltd and another [2012] EWCA Civ 987. Not to apply QOCS on appeals would deny access to justice. Wickes Building Supplies Ltd v Blair [2019] EWCA Civ 1934 The Court of Appeal considered whether objecting to the claimant's late witness statement, served just a couple of days after the end of Stage 2, was objecting to the claim under para 9.1 of PD 8B. At first instance the court had simply rejected the late statement. At first tier appeal the court found that the defendant was opposing the claim because the evidence was not provided under the relevant protocol. However, the Court of Appeal held the judge at first instance was correct, and quashed the first tier appeal decision. (1) Akram v Aviva Insurance Ltd and (2) Mahmood v Tillott HHJ Jarman QC, Wrexham CC, 29th Sept 2021 (The Claimants in both appeals relied on emails from their solicitors uploaded in Stage 2 at the Stage 3 hearings. The Defendant appealed both arguing no weight should be given to the contents of those emails, and that the information therein could only be provided by way of witness statement. HHJ Jarman QC upheld both lower court decisions finding that this was appropriate in the fairly rough justice of the Portal.) Mulholland v Hughes HHJ Freedman, Newcastle CC, 18th Sept 2015 (First Tier Appeal - Offers in the Portal do not amount to admissions, Claimants have to repay over-payment of damages in non-settlement payment, Arguments at Stage 3 limited by those in Stage 2 pack.) Khan v Alliance Insurance Plc HHJ Gosnell, Leeds CC, 1st Jun 2020 (Judge cannot raise an issue in Stage 3 not raised by the parties in Stage 2; Defendant can only challenge claim in limited way in the Portal.) Mozzano v Riwa DDJ Dawson, Birkenhead CC, 24th April 2012 (Multiple CNFs - how to deal.) Raja v Day & MIB HHJ Gregory, Liverpool CC, 02.03.15 (First Tier Appeal - Default position on finding a Portal breach is fixed costs, burden shifts to Claimant to show why should not apply.) Smith v Owen Birkenhead CC, DJ Campbell, 30th November 2016 (Unreasonable exit for non payment of tiny disbursement.) Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Yavuz & Ors [2017] EWHC 3088 (QB) (6 Dec 2017) (Contempt re completion of CNF.) David Grant v Dawn Meats (UK) [2018] EWCA Civ 2212 (Limitation, Stays and Service of a Portal Claim form.) Go Back to Index Click on the button below to go back to the case law index Index Search the site here:

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Hussain v Wardle - DJ Rank, Stoke on Trent CC, 25th February 2017. Here the CNF was rejected for lack of information. There was no test of reasonableness in CPR 45.24(2)(a) - unlike with leaving the Portal under CPR 45.24(2)(b)(i-iii). Key Point CNF rejected for lack of information - no test of reasonableness in CPR 45.24(2)(a) - unlike with leaving the Portal under CPR 45.24(2)(b)(i-iii) Hussain v Wardle Stoke on Trent CC, DJ Rank, 25th February 2017 The Claimant brought a claim in the MOJ Portal but failed to provide the Defendant's name in the CNF. The Defendant's name had not been provided at the scene. The Defendant Insurer rejected the CNF for incomplete information on it. The Defendant's name is a mandatory field. The Claimant then issued Part 7 proceedings and the claim settled by way of Part 36 offer. Costs went to Detailed Assessment. On Provisional Assessment the court found that the Claimant was in breach of the Portal Protocol, and restricted the Claimant to Portal costs. However, the Claimant applied for Oral Review, arguing it was not their fault they had failed to provide this mandatory information, and they had made good efforts to settle the claim after the claim left the Portal and before proceedings were issued, which should count in their favour. The court found there was a breach of the Portal Protocol, and went on to consider whether to exercise their discretion under CPR 45.24(2)(b). The court agreed with the Defendant that they could not use hindsight and speculation, per Tennant v Cottrell and Dawrant v Part & Parcel Network . Thus what happened after the Portal breach was irrelevant. The court agreed with the non-binding finding in Raja v Day & MIB , that the default position on the finding of a breach was that Portal costs should apply. The court found there were no exceptional circumstances which would justify a change from the default position. There were well-established ways of finding out the Defendant's details. The court also considered the fact that the claim had settled by way of a Part 36 offer, but rejected the Claimant's argument that this precluded an award under CPR 45.24(2). DJ Rank relied on the judgment of Lo rd Justice Moore-Bick in Solomon v Cromwell in this regard and quoted him at [17] thus: If the appellants' argument were correct, the acceptance of a Part 36 offer would always result in an order for costs on the standard basis in low-value road traffic accident cases. That would undermine the fixed costs regime and provide a powerful incentive for defendants not to make Part 36 offers in such cases... In the absence of any exceptional circumstances which would justify departing from the established default position, the court found that they would restrict the Claimant to Portal costs. There are not many cases of claims which have come out of the Portal because of lack of information on the CNF, so this is a particularly useful case. Note that there is no test of reasonableness in CPR 45.24(2)(a) as there is in CPR 45.24(2)(b). Thus even though the Claimant had ostensibly a good reason for not completing one of the mandatory fields, it could not and did not avail him. The rule in CPR 45.24(2)(a) only requires the Defendant to have rejected the claim because of INSUFFICIENT information. There is no requirement for the missing information to be mandatory. There is a curious further Portal provision at para 6.8 of the RTA Protocol, which provides that where a Defendant considers inadequate MANDATORY information has been provided, that shall be a valid reason for the Defendant to decide that the claim should no longer continue under the Protocol. There is no assessment of the reasonableness or not of the Defendant anywhere in CPR 45.24, there is no weighing of each party's behaviour, so it is unclear why this rule exists. In practice, it seems to operate to strengthen a Defendant's position when seeking an order under CPR 45.24(2)(a) where the insufficient information arises from a missing or incomplete mandatory field. However it does appear to some litigants into thinking that there is a benefit in trying to establish that a Defendant's decision to reject a CNF was invalid. Time will tell. Watch this space! Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Key Point

Key Point Where there are two claimants in a SIIIA fixed costs claim, each claimant is entitled to a separate award of fixed costs Melloy & Anor v UK Insurance Ltd [2022] EW Misc 4 (CC) The court had to consider what costs to award two claimants where they had brought separate claims in the portal, but a joint claim in Part 7 proceedings. At [10], HHJ Glen held that 'claim' and 'claimant' refer to the claim started by, and the claimant who submitted the CNF, rather than to the claim or claimant in the proceedings. He derived support for this position from West v Burton [2021] EWCA Civ 1005, where the court found that the executor of a claimant who had died after Portal proceedings had commenced was not 'the claimant' for the purposes of fixed costs on leaving the Portal. Therefore, he concluded that where there were two or more claimants in proceedings for damages that fall within SIIIA of CPR 45, assuming each had submitted a CNF, were separately entitled to all the costs set out in Table 6B. Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index