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To book counsel for a hearing or for drafting, please use this page. Contact / Book Counsel To enquire if counsel is available, please complete this form and we will get back to you shortly. Fee Earner's name* Name of Solicitor's Firm* Email Address* Do you require an Advice/Drafting?* Hearing Only Hearing and Advice/Drafting Advice/Drafting Only Name of Court (leave blank if drafting only) Date of Hearing Time and Estimated Length of Hearing Details of Instruction* SUBMIT Chambers' Telephone Number 0800 634 9650 From outside the UK: +44 (0)191 580 0237 Professional clients will be provided with Sarah's mobile number directly. Members of the General Public should note that Sarah Robson cannot advise them directly; she is not Direct Access qualified . They should see a solicitor. Email email@sarahrobsonbarrister.co.uk Linked In uk.linkedin.com/in/sarahrobsonbarrister Blue Sky https://bsky.app/profile/sarahrobsonbarrister.co.uk Mastodon @Portal_Queen@c.im (@Portal_Queen@c.im) Postal Address Please do not post papers to the chambers address. Professional clients will be provided with Sarah Robson's postal address directly. Document Exchange Please note that Sarah Robson is no longer on the document exchange as of November 2022 . X (Twitter) @Portal_Queen Sarah Robson is no longer active on Twitter

Sarah Robson is not a Direct Access qualified barrister. Members of the public will have to get a solicitor to instruct her. This page tells you what your solicitor can do for you if you get a Liability Order against you which you dispute - how to apply to set it aside - appeal - and how to "Check, Challenge, Appeal" non-domestic rates in the Valuation Tribunal. Act fast - you have days or weeks in which to apply to set aside a liablity order. Sarah Robson Barrister Fixed Costs Specialist Call now on 0800 634 9650 Liability Orders Members of the General Public are reminded that they should see a SOLICITOR if they have a problem with a liability order. Sarah Robson cannot speak to members of the public directly. How to Appeal a Liability Order Challenge liability to pay in the Valuation Tribunal The Valuation Tribunal The Valuation Tribunal is the place to dispute liability for non-domestic or business rates. See their website for more details at: www.valuationtribunal.gov.uk Can I Appeal a Liability Order? I am often asked if liability orders can be appealed. Yes you can, but that is an expensive route and the timescales are tiny. If you believe the liability order should not have been made in the first place, and/or it was made in error, then it would be far cheaper instead to apply to set it aside - but you need to act really fast. Challenges to liability to pay non-domestic rates are often better brought in the Valuation Tribunal . The secret to successfully challenging a liability order is to act fast as soon as you receive a summons or think a liability order may have been made. It is not unlike applying to set aside a statutory demand when it comes to time running. Write to the court and ask for a hearing to consider your application to set the liability order aside. Setting Aside Liability Orders Magistrates are creatures of statute, and do not have a statutory power to re-open civil cases, even when they know they have made an error! This used to mean that the only way to challenge a liability order was to judicially review the order - a highly expensive process. A common law power to re-open a civil case by magistrates developed in case law, which is unusual for civil matters in the largely criminal court of the magistrates. This was set out in Liverpool City Council v Pleroma Distribution Ltd [2002] EWHC 2467 (Admin) (“Plemora”) as where there had been a substantial procedural defect, where it has done something which is unlawful and in excess of its jurisdiction. R (on the application of Newham London Borough Council) v Stratford Magistrates' Court & Selwyn Dublin R (on the application of Newham London Borough Council) v Stratford Magistrates' Court & Selwyn Dublin (Interested Party) [2008] EWHC 125 (Admin), [2008] RA 108, [2008] All ER (D) 17 (Jan) [2008] In this case, Dublin claimed he had not been aware of the proceedings. He did not submit nor prove that order was unlawful or made in excess of jurisdiction, or in ignorance of a significant fact concerning their procedure of which the justices should have been aware, as required in Brighton & Hove. The District Judge allowed the application because he had an ‘arguable case’. The council applied to Judicially Review the decision of the District Judge to set aside the liability order. At Judicial Review Sarah successfully argued that was the wrong test. The test to set aside a liability order was not simply where it would be reasonable and in the interests of justice to do so – such a test would be too wide and vague. A liability order cannot be overturned simply by showing an arguable case. The court must be satisfied: the order was made as a result of a substantial procedural error, defect or mishap, that there was both a genuine and dispute as to that liability, and that the application was made promptly. Finding ‘some doubt’ over the original decisions does not satisfy the correct test, neither would allegations as to non-receipt of summonses, etc, even if proved. However he went on to say: “If non-attendance at a hearing because of a traffic accident would be sufficient to satisfy that criterion, I find it difficult to see why non-receipt of the notice of the hearing might not also qualify.” How the power to set aside developed In R (Brighton and Hove City Council) v Brighton and Hove Justices [2004] EWHC 1980 (Admin) (“Brighton & Hove”), HHJ Burnton said it was important to note that the power Maurice Kay J held to exist in Plemora to set aside a liability order could not be exercised simply where the defendant disputed his liability. There must be a substantial defect, and not on the part of the defendant. Further, in Camberwell, at para 37, LJ Waller expressed disquiet over the Plemora case, saying it was not free from doubt. Further, at para 34, HHJ Burnton stated the proper consideration was: “whether there had been any procedural defect in the proceedings that led to making of the liability orders, and whether (the defendant) had applied promptly for them to be set aside after learning they had been made.” In Brighton & Hove, HHJ Burnton (at para 31) held that it would be exceptional to set aside a liability order, something to be undertaken cautiously. Further (para 37) he stressed the importance of the need for finality in proceedings for liability orders, and how it is inappropriate to re-open orders simply where it would be reasonable and in the interests of justice to do so – that test was too wide and vague. HHJ Burnton further held that a court should not set aside a liability order unless it is satisfied that there is a genuine and arguable dispute as to the defendant’s liability for the rates in question, AND a. the order was made as a result of a substantial procedural error, defect or mishap. (The court must be satisfied that the order was unlawful or made in excess of jurisdiction, or in ignorance of a significant fact concerning their procedure of which the justices should have been aware) AND b. the application to the justices for the order to be set aside is made promptly after the defendant learns that it has been made or has notice that an order may have been made. Prompt action should be taken within a matter of days or at most a very few weeks, not months, and certainly not as much as a year, (para 33). (Brighton and Hove City Council) v Brighton and Hove Justices [2004] EWHC 1980 (Admin) When does time start to run? Time starts to run from constructive notice that an order may have been made Prompt Application Those wishing to apply to set aside a liability order should note that as a matter of principle for all challenges to administrative and judicial decisions, the application should be made promptly. Time starts to run from the date of the order, or from when a defendant has notice or constructive notice of the order. Constructive notice of a liability order can be deemed from as little as notice of the issue of a summons with no notice of the actual outcome – para 33 Brighton & Hove; “the jurisdiction to reopen a liability order will be unavailable to a defendant who delays in circumstances in which he has notice that an order may have been made, although he had not received a copy or been informed that an order has been made." Those who wish to challenge a finding of liability to pay council tax will be pleased to note that there is no time limit for appealing to the council concerned, providing they have not already given a decision notice or 'final decision'.

Purcell v McGarry - the court held that offer and acceptance have no place in the MOJ Portal - it is a stand-alone code. Key Point Contract Law, including offer and acceptance, has no place in MOJ Portal Protocol cases Purcell v McGarry HHJ Gore QC, Liverpool CC, Friday 7th December 2012 The issue here on first tier appeal was whether a Defendant could accept an offer after the end of Stage 2. The judge held that a Portal offer remains open for acceptance after the end of Stage 2. Importantly he noted that contract rules such as offer and acceptance have no place in the Portal arena. This case is important as it establishes that a Portal offer does not automatically cease to be open for acceptance. It has been followed by other cases which have held how offers made in the Portal remain open for acceptance even after Part 7 proceedings have been issued. It also makes it clear that the Portal is 'its own man' and thus contract law does not apply. Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Portal Admissions binding outside? Disapplication of Common Law

Sarah Robson gathers together case law on how courts have dealt with individual heads of loss which have been agreed within the MOJ Portal Process, showing the difference made when the claim is in the portal, leaves the portal or what stage the claim is at Individual Heads of Loss in the MOJ Portals Bewicke-Copley v Ibeh DJ Vincent, Oxford CC, 4th Jun 2015 (Agreed individual heads of loss are binding) Bushell v Parry HHJ Gregory, Liverpool CC, 15th March 2015 (First Tier Appeal - Agreed individual heads of loss are not binding) Maddocks v Lyn e HHJ Wood QC, Chester CC, 22nd January 2016 (First Tier Appeal - Agreed individual heads of loss are normally binding, entire Portal settlements are binding) Phillips v Willis [2016] EWCA Civ 401 (Irrational for judge to order case out of Portal, individual heads of loss can be agreed) Go Back to Index Click on the button below to go back to the case law index Index Search the site here:

Mason v Laing HHJ Gosnell, Bradford CC, 20.01.20. The court held that soft tissue injury claims must disclose the first report before subsequent reports are disclosed. The damages were assessed without reference to the subsequent report. The Portal rule are strict; parties could only rely on evidence sent according to the rules, and PD8B had not been complied with. Key Point Soft Tissue Injury Claims must disclose first report before subsequent reports are disclosed Mason v Laing HHJ Gosnell, Bradford CC, 20th Jan 2020 HHJ Gosnell held that a Claimant in a soft tissue injury claim could not rely on subsequent reports where the first report had not been disclosed before the subsequent reports. Damages were assessed based on the first report only. He noted that PD8B stipulated that parties could only rely on evidence in Stage 3 where this had been sent under the relevant protocol and as this had not been sent in accordance with the protocol rules, it could not be relied upon. He also found that there was no provision in the Portal Protocol to allow any application for Relief from Sanctions, complying with the usual finding that the Portal is an entirely stand-alone code. Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Chimel v Chibwana & Williams HHJ Simpkiss, Reigate CC, 31st October 2016 - This appeal confirmed that a Portal admission is binding to the world, i.e. both in and outside of the Portal. This resolved the position of the two inconsistent first instance decisions of Ullah v Jon and Malak v Nasim concerning whether an admission in the Portal is binding outside the Portal, and concurs with Maddocks v Lyne which almost accidentally found the same. Key Point A Portal admission is binding to the World Chimel v Chibwana & Williams HHJ Simpkiss, Reigate CC, 31st Oct 2016 This first tier appeal directly resolved the position of the two inconsistent first instance decisions of Ullah v Jon and Malak v Nasim on whether an admission in the Portal is binding outside the Portal, and concurs with the almost accidental finding of the same in Maddocks v Lyne . The court confirmed that a Portal admission is binding to the world, i.e. both in and outside of the Portal. Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Bushell v Parry HHJ Gregory, Liverpool CC, 15th March 2015. Departing from Bewicke-Copley v Ibeh. SINCE OVERTURNED BY MADDOCKS V LYNE. Shows the importance of pleadings. The issue was whether the Claimant was bound by the agreements reached on individual heads of loss in the Portal, but these were not pleaded in the defence. Held the Claimant was not bound by individual heads of loss agreed in the Portal., but if wrong on that then the Defence did not plead the agreement. Key Point Where defence silent re Portal agreement on individual heads of loss, parties not bound by those agreements (departing from Bewicke-Copley ) SINCE OVERTURNED BY MADDOCKS V LYNE Bushell v Parry HHJ Gregory, Liverpool CC, 15th March 2015 This claim had started in the Portal where some heads of loss were agreed, but then the claim left the Portal and Part 7 proceedings were issued. The Defendants put in a Defence putting the Claimant to and said nothing about some of the heads of loss having already been agreed in the Portal. The issue was whether the Claimant was bound by the agreements reached on individual heads of loss in the Portal. Most significantly that included personal injury, without which the Part 7 claim would have been in the small claims track. The judge found that the Claimant was not bound by individual heads of loss in the Portal. He said if he was wrong on that then the defence which acted as though everything was and had not pleaded the Portal agreement, Bewicke-Copley v Ibeh distinguished. Please note this case has now been overturned by Maddocks v Lyne , a case which HHJ Gregory himself gave permission to appeal on. Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Miscellaneous fixed costs cases including Montreal Convention claims, Portal Interim payments, Offers of zero and how to treat cases where a range of prognosis is given. Miscellaneous cases Offer of Zero is a Valid Offer Dickinson v Langford Birkenhead CC, 14th Feb 2013 Piotr Glazer v Nathan Reid DDJ Johnson, Liverpool CC, 2nd Mar 2012 Range of Prognosis Period given Dominic v Martin HHJ Stewart QC, Manchester CC, 21st Jul 2011 (First Portal appeal, established that should award in middle where range of prognosis given in absence of witness evidenc e) Interim Payments Luvin v Ageas Insurance Ltd DJ Doyle, Birkenhead CC, 17th Sept 2015 (Sets out the rules and procedure on interim payments) Ampratwum v Zbigniew Samajeden & Esure Birkenhead CC, 5th Jun 2013 (special rules on interim payments for vehicle related damages - judgment not available) Montreal Convention Claims Mead v British Airways PLC DJ Moss, Manchester County Court, 15th Jan 2018 (The Portal does not apply to Montreal Convention Claims) McKendry v Br itish Airways PLC DJ Baldwin (sitting as Regional Costs Judge) Liverpool County Court, 16th May 2018 (The Portal does not apply to Montreal Convention Claims) Go Back to Index Click on the button below to go back to the case law index Index Search the site here:

HHJ Wood QC, Chester CC, 22nd January 2016 - Parties cannot renege on individual heads of loss agreed at Stage 2 except in exceptional circumstances, so long as the claim remains in the portal. Thus Agreements on individual heads of loss are binding at Stage 2. Also the court held (Obiter) that Portal settlements on complete claims are binding to the World. Key Points Agreements on individual heads of loss are binding at Stage 2 and (Obiter) Portal settlements on complete claims are binding to the World Maddocks v Lyne HHJ Wood QC, Chester CC, 22nd Jan 2016 Parties agreed some individual heads of loss during Stage 2, but at the Stage 3 hearing the Claimant re-opened them, which the judge allowed. The Defendant appealed, arguing that agreements reached in the Portal on individual heads of were binding. The Defendant argued how the a Stage 3 hearing was defined as a hearing to determine items which remained in dispute. The Claimant argued that the wording of the rules only referred to 'offer' in the singular. The Defendant relied on Bewicke-Copley v Ibeh which said they are, and the Claimant relied on Bushell v Parry which said they were not. Permission to appeal, in some delicious irony, was given to the Defendants by HHJ Gregory, who had decided the Bushell case. In a long and reserved judgment, HHJ Wood QC held that where a claim remained in the Portal, as here, those items agreed at Stage 2 would be binding on both parties except in very exceptional cases. The judge went on to find, obiter, that if the matter left the Portal, then individual heads of loss were not binding, although the judgment notes that no argument was heard on this point. The court also went on to find, again obiter, that if all heads of loss were agreed in the Portal then it was binding on the world. Whilst confirming the original position as found in Bewicke-Copley v Ibeh , this decision also resolved the dispute between the inconsistent decisions of Ullah v Jon and Malak v Nasim , on whether admissions in the Portal are binding outside of that Portal claim where there is no judgment, by confirming that where settlement is reached on all heads of loss that the agreement is binding on the world, it does not require a judgment to be binding. That point was then confirmed, ratio, 10 months later in the appeal decision of Chimel v Chibwana & Williams . Click here for a copy of the judgment Click here for a PDF copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Castle v Andrews & Dickens Ltd DJ Doyle, Birkenhead CC, 21st Nov 2019. When is a portal offer not a portal offer? Protocol offers remain open for acceptance until withdrawn, even after Part 7 proceedings have been issued, but not all offers made in the portal are Protocol offers. Key Point Protocol offers remain open for acceptance until withdrawn, even after Part 7 proceedings have been issued, but not all offers made in the portal are Protocol offers Castle v Andrews & Dickens Ltd DJ Doyle, Birkenhead CC, 21st Nov 2019 This claim had started in the MOJ RTA Portal butPart 7 proceedings were issued. Later the Defendant sought to accept the Claimant's Portal offer, but the Claimant argued that their offer was no longer available for acceptance, distinguishing Purcell v McGarry and Akinroyde v EUI. The court found that there was some conflation in previous cases between a Stage 2 portal offer and a Protocol offer, noting that a Protocol offer was a formal term with various cost consequences. Per CPR 36.25 defines a Protocol offer as one set out in the Court Proceedings Pack (Part B) form, and CPR 36.20(8) also converts a defendant's Stage 2 offer to a Protocol offer if a claim leaves the portal before Stage 3 is commenced. Protocol offers were open for acceptance after claims left the portal, whilst Stage 2 offers were not. Otherwise in a case where a claimant wanted to bring in vehicle related damages at the end of Stage 2 per 7.52 of the portal protocol, a defendant could fail to make an offer in Stage 2 causing the claim to leave the portal before the claimant could seek their vehicle related damages in the portal, and then accept the claimant's first Portal offer and not have to pay anything for vehicle related damages at all. The court held this could not be what was intended. Click here for a copy of a note of Judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Raja v Day & MIB HHJ Gregory, Liverpool CC, 2nd March 2015 At first instance, the lower court found that the claim would have left the Portal anyway, and declined to restrict the Claimant to Portal costs. However, on appeal, the court found the Claimant had acted unreasonably. The court also held that the lower court had been wrong to find that the claim would have left the Portal anyway. The Claimant was restricted to Portal costs. Raja v Day & MIB HHJ Gregory, Liverpool CC, 2nd Mar 2015 The Claimant had some difficulty in locating the correct and sent CNFs to a number of incorrect Defendants before finding the correct one. However, instead of sending them a CNF first, the Claimant issued Part 7 proceedings against them. At first instance, the lower court found that the claim would have left the Portal anyway, and declined to restrict the Claimant to Portal costs. However, on appeal, the court found the Claimant had acted unreasonably. The court also held that the lower court had been wrong to find that the claim would have left the Portal anyway. The Claimant was restricted to Portal costs. This case, along with Tennant v Cottrell , Dawrant v Part & Parcel Network and Hussain v Wardle confirms that a court cannot use hindsight when assessing whether a Claimant has acted unreasonably in breaching the Portal. A court must look at things as they were at the time of the breach. There can be no retrospective justification for an earlier Portal breach. Click here for a copy of the judgment Click here for a PDF copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Rafiania v All Type Scaffolding Ltd DDJ Corscadden, Manchester CC, 14th January 2015. The court held that there is no test of reasonableness in not using the Portal at all, unlike in leaving or causing a claim to leave the Portal. It was not unlike 'strict liability'. Therefore the Claimant's ostensibly good reasons could not avail them. The Claimant was restricted to Portal costs. Key Point No test of reasonableness in not using the Portal at all Rafiania v All Type Scaffolding Ltd DDJ Corscadden, Manchester CC, 14th January 2015 The Defendant wrote to the Claimant and denied liability before a CNF was ever sent. CNFs sent for other occupants of the same vehicle in this accident and liability was denied. The Claimant, therefore, did not bother to send a CNF, thinking there was no point. The matter went through Part 7 proceedings, and damages were settled although costs were not. The Defendant argued that the Claimant should be restricted to Portal costs, per CPR 45.24(2)(c), as opposed to the more common CPR 45.24(2)(b). The Claimant argued that they had acted reasonably in not using the Portal at all. However, the court held that there is no test of reasonableness in not using the Portal at all, unlike in leaving or causing a claim to leave the Portal. It was not unlike 'strict liability'. Therefore the Claimant's ostensibly good reasons could not avail them. The Claimant was restricted to Portal costs. This case shows the importance of looking carefully at the Portal rules. The Claimant solicitors appeared in court all ready to argue how reasonable they had been, having completely missed the point that the rules are different for leaving the Portal and not using the Portal at all. Whilst arguably, it would have been pointless to have used the Portal, the rules are highly prescriptive and parties should note they must follow them closely. Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index