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Hislop v Perde [2018] EWCA Civ 1726 - Late acceptance of a Part 36 offer in SIIIA CPR 45 Fixed Costs. At [44] the court said the general rule (r.36.13, old rule r.36.10) is not preserved by the rule applicable to fixed costs cases (r.36.20, old rule r.36.10A). Instead, r.36.20 makes plain that it is the only rule which applies to the costs consequences of acceptance of a Part 36 offer in fixed costs cases. It preserves no part of the general rule set out in r.36.13. Key Point Late acceptance of a Part 36 offer in SIIIA CPR 45 Fixed Costs Hislop v Perde;Kaur v Committee (for the time being) of Ramgarhia Board Leicester [2018] EWCA Civ 1726 Costs consequences of acceptance of a Part 36 offer are prescribed in CPR 36.13. However, not when a claim is governed by SIIIA, i.e. it was previously in the Portal, because CPR 36.20 operates INSTEAD not as well as 36.13. CPR 36.20 does not disapply fixed costs where there has been late acceptance. CPR 45.29J costs are still available but are unaffected by late acceptance alone. At para 44 of the judgment it says: Whilst the general rule dealing with costs consequences following judgment (r.36.17) is expressly preserved by the particular rule relating to the fixed costs regime (r.36.21), that is not the position in relation to the rules relating to the costs consequences of accepting Part 36 offers before trial. For that situation, the general rule (r.36.13, old rule r.36.10) is not preserved by the rule applicable to fixed costs cases (r.36.20, old rule r.36.10A). Instead, r.36.20 makes plain that it is the only rule which applies to the costs consequences of acceptance of a Part 36 offer in fixed costs cases. It preserves no part of the general rule set out in r.36.13. 45. What is more, r.36.13 itself says that it is “subject to” r.36.20 which, because that rule applies to fixed costs cases and r.36.13 does not, also leads to the conclusion that r.36.13 does not apply to fixed costs cases. Where (without more) a general rule is made ‘subject to’ a specific rule that governs a particular class of case then, in that class of case (here, those subject to fixed costs), it will be the specific rule that applies, not the general rule (see Solomon). Click here for a copy of the judgment Click here for a PDF copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Coleman v Townsend Master Haworth, SCCO, 13th July 2020. Disbursements not recoverable in SIIIA cases where fixed costs allow for that work, even when ordered. The court noted it preferred the submissions of Sarah Robson over Ben Williams KC. Key Point Recoverability of disbursements in SIIIA cases Coleman v Townsend Master Haworth, SCCO, 13th July 2020 This was an appeal from an Oral Review of a Provisional Assessment. The appeal was limited to two items; Counsel's abated brief fee for trial and Counsel's skeleton argument. The costs were governed by SIIIA of CPR 45. The defendant made a Part 36 offer just over 21 days before trial. There was an order for skeleton arguments to be exchanged two clear days before trial, so the relevant period of the offer included the due date for the skeleton arguments. The claimant accepted the defendant's offer the day before trial, and sought their costs of the ordered skeleton argument and abated brief fee. At first instance the court had disallowed counsel's fee for drafting the Particulars of Claim, but allowed the fee for the skeleton argument and abated brief fee. The defendant appealed. The claimant was represented by Ben Williams QC and the defendant by Sarah Robson . Mr Williams argued that the brief had to be delivered before the day of the trial, it would have been unreasonable not to have done so. He sought the abated brief fee not under Table 6B section D as that is clearly only payable on the day of trial which had not been reached but rather under CPR 45.29I(2)(h). He further argued that the defendant could not complain where they had made an offer open for acceptance for 21 days where those 21 days included the due date for skeleton arguments - there was nothing wrong with waiting to see what arguments were going to be presented before deciding to accept the defendant's offer. He also argued that the 'swings and roundabouts' argument no longer applied in the post-LASPO world. The hearing was adjourned part heard pending the decision in Cham v Aldred . Once that decision was published, the claimant then argued that the trial advocates' fee was not earned under Table 6B, as that fee is only earned on the date of trial itself, but rather simply as a disbursement and was recoverable under ss(h). There was therefore no duplication of the trial advocacy fee in Table 6B. The defendant argued that fixed costs were designed to give certainty and the trial advocacy fee was clearly intended to only be recoverable inter-parties once the day of trial had been reached. Likewise the skeleton argument was part of the trial preparation and should similarly be disallowed. The judge preferred the submissions of the Appellant/Defendant, finding that the costs of preparing for trial included preparing the skeleton argument and that stage had simply not been reached. It was therefore not payable, and the appeal was allowed. Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

About Sarah Robson Barrister - Black Belt Barrister - Fixed Costs Specialist. Article in Counsel Magazine about being a black belt barrister. Newspaper interview with The Sun regarding Tyson Fury and liability orders. Geographical Areas for in person hearings - based in the East Midlands, she covers Norwich to Southampton, Cardiff to York, Bristol to Liverpool About Sarah Robson Sarah Robson Barrister Fixed Costs Specialist Call now on 0800 634 9650 Geographical Area Covered The yellow circle shows the courts that Sarah Robson normally works in for in person hearings, although most of her work is still remote so all courts in England & Wales are available. Sarah Robson is closest to courts around the Coventry / Northampton / Milton Keynes / Birmingham / Leicester / Reading area, but also regularly travels to Birkenhead, Liverpool, Leeds, Cardiff, Manchester, Bristol and across London. Sarah will travel further by arrangement. The Sun Newspaper - December 2023 Sarah Robson was recently interviewed by a National Newspaper, The Sun, regarding a specialist court case concerning liability orders for the boxer, Tyson Fury. This article appeared on the front page of The Sun in December 2023. Read the article here: Tyson Fury's next big fight is against the tax man - after champ accused of dodging massive bill | The Sun Counsel Magazine Oct 2023 Lessons learnt: The black belt barrister | COUNSEL | The Magazine of the Bar of England and Wales (counselmagazine.co.uk) Counsel magazine recently ran an article about Sarah Robson being a black belt and a barrister, in particular how each 'skill set' impacts on the other. Alpha Court Chambers Sarah practices at: Alpha Court Chambers alphacourtchambers.co.uk 12 Paddock Close Bidford-on-Avon, Alcester Warwickshire B50 4PJ Professional clients should ring for Sarah's postal address if needed.

Kilby v Brown - DJ Peake, Birkenhead CC, 10th February 2014 - Leaving the Portal for technical non-compliance only is not justified and Common Law Waiver and Affirmation do not apply in the Portal Key Points Leaving the Portal for technical non-compliance only is not justified and Common Law Waiver and Affirmation do not apply in the Portal Kilby v Brown DJ Peake, Birkenhead CC, 10th February 2014 Here the Defendants inadvertently underpaid the Claimant their Stage 2 payment by a mere £15. The Claimant solicitors ceased upon the opportunity to remove the claim from the Portal. The costs went to a separate hearing where the court considered whether the Claimant had acted reasonably in removing the claim from the Portal in circumstances where there had been a clear and admitted breach of the Portal Protocol. The judge held that the Claimant solicitors had been wholly unreasonable and restricted the claimant to Portal costs under CPR 45.24(2)(b)(i). The Defendant also argued that as the Claimant had banked their cheque, they had thereby affirmed their breach. However, the judge held that the Portal is and that the common law doctrines of waiver and affirmation do not apply. Click here for a link to an article about this case in the Liverpool Echo People often say this case was only decided this way because the Claimant had run up an unreasonable £16K of costs in a simple low-level case. However, those were the total costs of both sides and included the additional costs arising from the additional hearing the costs dispute caused. The principle applies equally however much the parties costs are, and indeed now most would fall under SIIIA fixed costs. Click here for a copy of the judgment Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index Go back to Main Index

HHJ Wood QC, Chester CC, 22nd January 2016. Individual heads of loss agreed in the Portal are binding whilst the case remains in the Portal, overturning Bushell v Parry and upholding Bewicke-Copley v Ibeh Key Points Agreements on individual heads of loss are binding at Stage 2 and (Obiter) Portal settlements on complete claims are binding to the World Maddocks v Lyne HHJ Wood QC, Chester CC, 22nd January 2016 Parties agreed some individual heads of loss during Stage 2, but at the Stage 3 hearing the Claimant re-opened them, which the judge allowed. The Defendant appealed, arguing that agreements reached in the Portal on individual heads of were binding. The Defendant argued how the a Stage 3 hearing was defined as a hearing to determine items which remained in dispute. The Claimant argued that the wording of the rules only referred to 'offer' in the singular. The Defendant relied on Bewicke-Copley v Ibeh which said they are, and the Claimant relied on Bushell v Parry which said they were not. Permission to appeal, in some delicious irony, was given to the Defendants by HHJ Gregory, who had decided the Bushell case. In a long and reserved judgment, HHJ Wood QC held that where a claim remained in the Portal, as here, those items agreed at Stage 2 would be binding on both parties except in very exceptional cases. The judge went on to find, obiter, that if the matter left the Portal, then individual heads of loss were not binding, although the judgment notes that no argument was heard on this point. The court also went on to find, again obiter, that if all heads of loss were agreed in the Portal then it was binding on the world. Whilst confirming the original position as found in Bewicke-Copley v Ibeh , this decision also resolved the dispute between the inconsistent decisions of Ullah v Jon and Malak v Nasim , on whether admissions in the Portal are binding outside of that Portal claim where there is no judgment, by confirming that where settlement is reached on all heads of loss that the agreement is binding on the world, it does not require a judgment to be binding. That point was then confirmed, ratio, 10 months later in the appeal decision of Chimel v Chibwana & Williams . Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Ilahi v Usman - HHJ Platts, Manchester CC, 29th November 2012 - A decision to take a step which automatically removes a case from the Portal is an election to leave the Portal Key Point A decision to take a step which automatically removes a case from the Portal is an election to leave the Portal Ilahi v Usman HHJ Platts, Manchester CC, 29th Nov 2012 The Claimant withdrew all offers at the end of Stage 2, which caused the claim to automatically leave the Portal. The Claimant then argued that they could not be reduced to Portal costs because they had not elected to leave the Portal, it had happened automatically. The Claimant won at first instance. However, on first tier appeal, HHJ Platts found that if a party elects to take a step which has the automatic consequence of leaving the Portal, then they have elected to leave the Portal. He restricted the Claimant to Portal costs only. The Claimant sought permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. However, Jackson LJ refused permission on paper, noting he agreed with the reasoning given by HHJ Platts. Click here for the First Tier appeal judgment Click here for the Court of Appeal decision Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Hussain v Wardle - DJ Rank, Stoke on Trent CC, 25th February 2017. Here the CNF was rejected for lack of information. There was no test of reasonableness in CPR 45.24(2)(a) - unlike with leaving the Portal under CPR 45.24(2)(b)(i-iii). Key Point CNF rejected for lack of information - no test of reasonableness in CPR 45.24(2)(a) - unlike with leaving the Portal under CPR 45.24(2)(b)(i-iii) Hussain v Wardle Stoke on Trent CC, DJ Rank, 25th February 2017 The Claimant brought a claim in the MOJ Portal but failed to provide the Defendant's name in the CNF. The Defendant's name had not been provided at the scene. The Defendant Insurer rejected the CNF for incomplete information on it. The Defendant's name is a mandatory field. The Claimant then issued Part 7 proceedings and the claim settled by way of Part 36 offer. Costs went to Detailed Assessment. On Provisional Assessment the court found that the Claimant was in breach of the Portal Protocol, and restricted the Claimant to Portal costs. However, the Claimant applied for Oral Review, arguing it was not their fault they had failed to provide this mandatory information, and they had made good efforts to settle the claim after the claim left the Portal and before proceedings were issued, which should count in their favour. The court found there was a breach of the Portal Protocol, and went on to consider whether to exercise their discretion under CPR 45.24(2)(b). The court agreed with the Defendant that they could not use hindsight and speculation, per Tennant v Cottrell and Dawrant v Part & Parcel Network . Thus what happened after the Portal breach was irrelevant. The court agreed with the non-binding finding in Raja v Day & MIB , that the default position on the finding of a breach was that Portal costs should apply. The court found there were no exceptional circumstances which would justify a change from the default position. There were well-established ways of finding out the Defendant's details. The court also considered the fact that the claim had settled by way of a Part 36 offer, but rejected the Claimant's argument that this precluded an award under CPR 45.24(2). DJ Rank relied on the judgment of Lo rd Justice Moore-Bick in Solomon v Cromwell in this regard and quoted him at [17] thus: If the appellants' argument were correct, the acceptance of a Part 36 offer would always result in an order for costs on the standard basis in low-value road traffic accident cases. That would undermine the fixed costs regime and provide a powerful incentive for defendants not to make Part 36 offers in such cases... In the absence of any exceptional circumstances which would justify departing from the established default position, the court found that they would restrict the Claimant to Portal costs. There are not many cases of claims which have come out of the Portal because of lack of information on the CNF, so this is a particularly useful case. Note that there is no test of reasonableness in CPR 45.24(2)(a) as there is in CPR 45.24(2)(b). Thus even though the Claimant had ostensibly a good reason for not completing one of the mandatory fields, it could not and did not avail him. The rule in CPR 45.24(2)(a) only requires the Defendant to have rejected the claim because of INSUFFICIENT information. There is no requirement for the missing information to be mandatory. There is a curious further Portal provision at para 6.8 of the RTA Protocol, which provides that where a Defendant considers inadequate MANDATORY information has been provided, that shall be a valid reason for the Defendant to decide that the claim should no longer continue under the Protocol. There is no assessment of the reasonableness or not of the Defendant anywhere in CPR 45.24, there is no weighing of each party's behaviour, so it is unclear why this rule exists. In practice, it seems to operate to strengthen a Defendant's position when seeking an order under CPR 45.24(2)(a) where the insufficient information arises from a missing or incomplete mandatory field. However it does appear to some litigants into thinking that there is a benefit in trying to establish that a Defendant's decision to reject a CNF was invalid. Time will tell. Watch this space! Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Case law on using the MOJ Portal Protocols - with the key point, a short summary and a copy of the judgment. Including LB Islington v Bourous [2022] EWCA Civ 1242, Wicks v Blair [2022] EWCA Civ 1242, Akram v Aviva HHJ Jarman QC, Wrexham CC, 29.09.21, Mulholland v Hughes HHJ Freedman, Newcastle CC, 18.09.15, Raja v Day HHJ Gregory, Liverpool CC, 02.03.15 and many other cases. Using the Portals London Borough of Islington v Bourous, Davis & Yousaf [2022] EWCA Civ 1242 Approved Mulholland v Hughes that a party cannot argue something in Stage 3 not raised in Stage 2, and commented that the White Book note re Phillips v Willis is not accurate. Wickes Building Supplies Ltd v Blair (No.2) Costs [2020] EWCA Civ 17 The Court of Appeal agreed with Sarah Robson that QOCS applied to this second tier appeal, preferring the reasoning of Edis J in Parker v Butler [2016] EWHC 1251 (QB) over that in both Wagenaar v Weekend Travel Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1105 and Hawksford Trustees Jersey Ltd v Stella Global UK Ltd and another [2012] EWCA Civ 987. Not to apply QOCS on appeals would deny access to justice. Wickes Building Supplies Ltd v Blair [2019] EWCA Civ 1934 The Court of Appeal considered whether objecting to the claimant's late witness statement, served just a couple of days after the end of Stage 2, was objecting to the claim under para 9.1 of PD 8B. At first instance the court had simply rejected the late statement. At first tier appeal the court found that the defendant was opposing the claim because the evidence was not provided under the relevant protocol. However, the Court of Appeal held the judge at first instance was correct, and quashed the first tier appeal decision. (1) Akram v Aviva Insurance Ltd and (2) Mahmood v Tillott HHJ Jarman QC, Wrexham CC, 29th Sept 2021 (The Claimants in both appeals relied on emails from their solicitors uploaded in Stage 2 at the Stage 3 hearings. The Defendant appealed both arguing no weight should be given to the contents of those emails, and that the information therein could only be provided by way of witness statement. HHJ Jarman QC upheld both lower court decisions finding that this was appropriate in the fairly rough justice of the Portal.) Mulholland v Hughes HHJ Freedman, Newcastle CC, 18th Sept 2015 (First Tier Appeal - Offers in the Portal do not amount to admissions, Claimants have to repay over-payment of damages in non-settlement payment, Arguments at Stage 3 limited by those in Stage 2 pack.) Khan v Alliance Insurance Plc HHJ Gosnell, Leeds CC, 1st Jun 2020 (Judge cannot raise an issue in Stage 3 not raised by the parties in Stage 2; Defendant can only challenge claim in limited way in the Portal.) Mozzano v Riwa DDJ Dawson, Birkenhead CC, 24th April 2012 (Multiple CNFs - how to deal.) Raja v Day & MIB HHJ Gregory, Liverpool CC, 02.03.15 (First Tier Appeal - Default position on finding a Portal breach is fixed costs, burden shifts to Claimant to show why should not apply.) Smith v Owen Birkenhead CC, DJ Campbell, 30th November 2016 (Unreasonable exit for non payment of tiny disbursement.) Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Yavuz & Ors [2017] EWHC 3088 (QB) (6 Dec 2017) (Contempt re completion of CNF.) David Grant v Dawn Meats (UK) [2018] EWCA Civ 2212 (Limitation, Stays and Service of a Portal Claim form.) Go Back to Index Click on the button below to go back to the case law index Index Search the site here:

Bursuc v EUI Ltd DJ Revere, Clerkenwell & Shoreditch CC, 30th May 2018. Here the court held that the Portal exit by the claimant was NOT unreasonable given D's behaviour. Also the court held that it was premature to apply to restrict a Claimant to Portal costs before the claim had concluded. Key Points Portal exit was not unreasonable given D's behaviour and It was premature to apply to restrict a Claimant to Portal costs before the claim had concluded Bursuc v EUI Ltd DJ Revere, Clerkenwell & Shoreditch CC, 30th May 2018 This claim started in the MOJ RTA Portal Protocol, but the Claimant removed it from the Portal following the Defendant's repeated requests for more information and further disclosure. The Claimant had warned the Defendant that if they kept requiring further information, that they risked making the claim too complex for the Portal, but the Defendant continued to ask for more. The Claimant then removed the claim from the Portal because it was too complex, and issued Part 7 proceedings. Whilst those proceedings were ongoing, the Defendant made an application for the Claimant to be restricted to Portal costs under CPR 45.24. The Claimant argued that it was premature to seek such an order before the claim had concluded, and in any event, the claim had become too complex and was no longer suitable for the portal. In a reserved judgment the court found that the application was made too early, and in any event the departure from the Portal was not unreasonable in all the circumstances. The Claimant had supplied over 50 pages of evidence, the credit hire claim was not insignificant at over £17K, and it was clear that two of the heads of loss were going to be strongly defended, and the Claimant had warned (not 'threatened' as D argued) the Defendant that the claim may leave the Portal if they sought any further information , yet they still asked for more. This is an unusual decision, finding that a Portal exit was reasonable as most cases have held the opposite. However, it does demonstrate that the Portal Protocol is only suitable for straightforward claims, and Defendants need to be careful they do not make a claim too complex by how they approach defending such claims, particularly where the vehicle related damages are larger. Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Tennant v Cottrell DJ Jenkinson, Liverpool CC, 11th December 2014 - you cannot change your reason for breach of Portal after the event, and there can be no 'Retrospective Justification' of an earlier Portal breach by what happened later. Key Points Cannot change reason for breach of Portal and there can be no 'Retrospective Justification' of an earlier Portal breach Tennant v Cottrell DJ Jenkinson, Liverpool CC, 11th December 2014 The Claimant removed this claim from the Portal when the Defendant made an offer of zero for one head of loss. Part 7 proceedings were issued in which the Defendant sought allocation to the fast track, and for the Claimant to attend for cross-examination. Costs went to Detailed Assessment. In Replies to Points of Dispute, the Claimant tried to argue for the first time that the claim had left the Portal because it was too complex, and pointed to the fact that the Defendant had sought to cross-examine the Claimant and allocate the claim. However, DJ Jenkinson found that the reason the Claimant had left the Portal was completely clear. That was set out in their letter at the time they left the Portal, stating they were doing so because the Defendant had offered zero on one head of loss. The judge said that you could not change your reason for leaving the Portal later, and there could be no argument that a claim 'would have left anyway'. o allow such an argument would be to allow a Claimant to 'retrospectively justify' their earlier unreasonable exit. He would not allow this. The Claimant was restricted to Portal costs. Claimants often try to argue that a claim 'would have left the Portal anyway'. However as this case makes clear, a party cannot change their reasons for leaving later, nor can they rely on anything which happened after a breach of the Portal when assessing whether they had acted unreasonably under CPR 45.24(2). Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

[2021] EWCA Civ 1005. Court of Appeal upheld HHJ Woods that claim run by executors was a different claim form that started in Portal. Key Point A claim which starts in the Portal - but the claimant then dies - is not the same claim and thus is not subject to the fixed costs of SIIIA of CPR 45 West (Executor of the Estate of the late Kenneth Morriss) v Burton [2021] EWCA Civ 1005 The Court upheld the decision of HHJ Wood QC on whether fixed costs of SIIIA applied to a claim where it had started in the Portal process, but left because the Claimant had died (unrelated to the accident.) The Court of Appeal noted at [39] that the meaning of 'claim' and 'claimant' were not the same in the Portal process as with 'normal' litigation and thus the definition of 'claim' in para 1.1(6) of the Portal protocol was not to be equated with the definition of 'claim' in CPR 2.3. The person who concluded the claim was the claimant's executor, not the same person as the person who started the claim in the Portal. Therefore SIIIA costs did not apply. The Claimant was entitled to SII fixed costs, the old 'predictive' costs. The judgment concludes by noting it would be a matter for the Rules Committee to consider if they should amend the rules to cover this situation in express terms. This seems unlikely given that this is the first case since the inception of the Portal in 2010 where such an issue appears to have arisen. Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Birkenhead CC, DJ Campbell, 30th November 2016. Yes friend, they seriously litigated over £2.50p. Key Point Unreasonable to leave portal for technical non-compliance only Smith v Owen Birkenhead CC, DJ Campbell, 30th Nov 2016 Here the claimant removed the claim from the MOJ RTA Portal for of two disbursements, one for photographs and one for the DVLA disbursements. The issue was whether the Claimant had acted unreasonably in doing so. The disbursement for photographs was not agreed. The Defendant said as much and it was virtually common ground that in disputing the disbursement, saying why it was in dispute, then the Defendant was not in breach by failing to pay that. The main argument was on the non-payment of the DVLA disbursement, a mere £2.50. The Claimant relied on the case of Chisanga which had held it was reasonable to leave the Portal for non-payment of the DVLA disbursement. However, DJ Campbell disagreed, noting she had been a solicitor for 20 years and would have been appalled at the idea of anyone in her firm issuing proceedings simply because of a non payment of £2.50 which it was well known would easily be 'scooped up' to be paid when the final order was made. The court decided at [47] that whilst there was no obligation under the rules for a Claimant to check with a Defendant why the £2.50 had not been paid, it was incumbent on any solicitor acting reasonably to have queried where the £2.50 was. She confirmed the approach of DJ Peake in Kilby v Brown to act reasonably and enquire before issuing. Whilst she acknowledged this made her decision at odds with another judge at the same court, she reached this decision based on her interpretation of the rules and meant no criticism on the other judge. The Claimant had acted unreasonably in leaving the Portal, and would be restricted to Portal costs. Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index